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Abstract 
This article analyzes the system developed within Europe, more precisely within 
the European Union through European Community law, to address the security-
sensitive issues involved in the export of hardware, software, and knowledge for 
the purpose of space activities and major space applications. The subject is intro-
duced with reference to the far better known export control developments within 
the United States, such as those concerning International Traffic in Arms Regula-
tions, and the international understandings under the Missile Technology Con-
trol Regime and Wassenaar Arrangement. European Community Regulations for 
export controls provide for a complex system of balances between national sov-
ereignty and Europe-wide harmonization. This European Community regime, 
though ultimately still dependent upon individual state’s sovereign controls, es-
tablishes an interesting measure of international harmonization in security-sensi-
tive export controls. Although the European Community regime is fraught with 
many complexities, it manages to avoid some of the pitfalls evident in the United 
States and international regimes, notably the confusing discussions on discern-
ing weaponry proper from other space items with dual-use potential. This is the 
result mainly of an approach characterized by a primary intention to harmonize, 
rather than to apply strict controls per se, resulting in a transparency and consis-
tency that are not only valuable to commercial entrepreneurs, but also to those 
concerned primarily with the security risks posed by the international space in-
dustry. As for the space industry in particular, it is helpful that the European 
Community regime specifically carves out civil space activities, for example if 
conducted within the context of the European Space Agency or national space 
agency activities. 
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O ne of the most hotly debated issues in current commercial and civil space activities concerns the United States (U.S.) International Traf-fic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). This most specific and substantive 
element of U.S. export controls on sensitive technologies has considerable ef-
fects on the possibilities for the U.S. space industry to compete in relevant in-
ternational markets, and on the possibilities of non-U.S. space operators, pub-
lic and private, to choose U.S. technologies and attendant hardware, software, 
and know-how for their operations, should they wish to do so.1 And indeed, 
though the many areas where U.S. technologies are key to undertaking a cer-
tain space activity may very gradually be declining, they are still numerous 
enough to make such attention understandable.
At the same time, one should not forget that other states, including long-
standing geopolitical allies of the U.S., have similar worries. These states 
would not like to see sensitive dual-use technology falling into the “wrong 
hands,” whether of states principally antagonistic to Western politics, culture, 
and society or of non-state actors with similar views of the West. From that 
perspective, the U.S. export control regime, which is most noticeably embod-
ied in ITAR, is no more than one national example of a broader effort to try to 
protect such security interests.
The current contribution tries to add to that perspective by highlighting 
how, in particular, the European states members of the European Union (EU) 
have undertaken collective efforts in the same direction, as part of their policy 
approach to implement the international arrangements on this level. Where 
appropriate, some high-level references and comparisons with the U.S. re-
gime are made to further underscore such an analysis.
The United States Export Controls Regime 
  
The U.S. export controls regime started to make serious inroads into the 
commercial space sector as soon as the latter started to grow fundamentally 
beyond subcontractor status vis-à-vis the government and the National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration (NASA), which occurred in the 1980s.2 In 
hindsight, it was inevitable that the high-key technology character of almost 
all space activities, and their inherent dual-use character, would raise issues 
related to the national security of the U.S. at the highest level. After all, at the 
same time that space became increasingly subject to commercial interests, the 
geopolitical scene was changing from an essentially bipolar world to a mul-
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tipolar one. In addition to a number of additional states that are important 
from a security perspective, certain non-state actors evolved into an interna-
tional security concern as well.3 The immediate concerns, from a space per-
spective, have been focused on the launching sector. Ever since Sputnik, it 
has been clear that the technical differentiation between a missile capable of 
delivering weapons—including those of mass destruction—to terrestrial tar-
gets, and a launch vehicle capable of delivering a payload in orbit, has been 
negligible.
The U.S. included such systems, and all components and key technologies 
involved, in the U.S. Munitions List (USML),4 which under the Arms Export 
Control Act (AECA),5 was subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S. Department 
of State. ITAR was drafted to control the export of such systems, components, 
and technologies to anywhere outside the U.S. where their presence might re-
sult in security threats.6 From a teleological perspective, launch systems capa-
ble of delivering bombs were essentially comparable to munitions, especially 
since the key phrase for invoking the above regime under the AECA was now 
phrased as widely as “defense articles.”7
Chapter IV of the USML comprised inter alia: 
(a) Rockets (including but not limited to meteorological and other sound-
ing rockets) … as well as launchers for such defense articles … (b) Launch 
vehicles and missile and anti-missile systems including but not limited to 
guided, tactical and strategic missiles, launchers, and systems … (h) All 
specifically designed or modified components, parts, accessories, attach-
ments, and associated equipment for the articles in this category … (i) 
Technical data … and defense services … directly related to the defense ar-
ticles enumerated in paragraphs (a) through (h) of this category.8
Inclusion in such a list was perhaps less obvious with regard to satellites, 
even as there could be little doubt that satellites were already supporting mil-
itary capabilities in many ways. Examples involved the provision of intelli-
gence, the provision of secure communications, and the guidance of missile 
and other weapon systems. Once satellite communications emerged as a via-
ble sector in the 1980s, the inclusion of satellites, their components and tech-
nologies in the USML became increasingly subject to debate.9
In terms of space activities, moreover, the U.S. Commerce Control List 
(CCL),10 existing in parallel to the USML played an important role, as well. 
The net result of the debate referred to above was a gradual transfer of all rel-
evant dual-use items (e.g., satellites, components, and technologies) from the 
USML to the CCL, and hence from the jurisdiction of the U.S. Department 
of State to the U.S. Department of Commerce.11 The CCL was ruled by the 
Export Administration Act (EAA),12 which dealt with the export of dual-use 
items for which an export authorization was required under the Export Ad-
ministration Regulations (EAR).
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“Dual-use” items were, of course, a well-known phenomenon across the 
space arena, and would without a doubt include satellites and their compo-
nents and technology for almost all imaginable purposes. Real-time remote 
sensing of medium or high resolution would not only be helpful for intelli-
gence gathering, but offered numerous civil and potentially commercial ben-
efits, such as in environmental, urban planning, and disaster management 
contexts. Satellite navigation, certainly if of a certain level of precision, could 
guide cars, ships, and aircraft to their destinations as much as bombs and 
cruise missiles. And of course, telecommunications using space was already 
a major commercial sector for some time; not only does today’s battleground 
efficiency crucially depend upon large-volume satellite communication capa-
bilities, but so do multiple commercial and other civil applications. As long 
as such space items were under the control of the Department of Commerce, 
however, there was a presumption that unless direct threats to U.S. security 
could be discerned, export should be allowed to boost the competitiveness of 
the U.S. commercial space industry in the international arena.13
This changed fundamentally in the course of the 1990s, following the Ti-
ananmen Square massacre in 1989, the Republican return to a U.S. Congres-
sional majority in 1994, and two Long March failures with U.S. satellites in 
1995 and 1996.14 The net result was the undoing of the transfer of dual-use 
technologies from the Department of State and the USML to the Department 
of Commerce and the CCL over the 1988-1996 periods. Most notably, the 1998 
Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act15 placed all satellites, 
satellite components, and satellite technologies back on the USML.16 Once an 
item is seen as falling within the USML, and hence, ruled by ITAR as deter-
mined by the relevant agencies within the U.S. Department of State, it can no 
longer claim the relative benefits of the export control regime falling under 
the jurisdiction of the Department of Commerce, which strikes a different bal-
ance between the security interests of the government and the commercial in-
terests of prospective exporters.
Because of the above, Chapter XV of the USML, dealing with “Spacecraft 
Systems and Associated Equipment,” now encompasses: 
(a) Spacecraft, including communications satellites, remote sensing satel-
lites, scientific satellites, research satellites, navigation satellites, experimen-
tal, and multi-mission satellites … (b) Ground control stations for teleme-
try, tracking and control of spacecraft or satellites, or employing any of the 
cryptographic items controlled … (c) Global Positioning System (GPS) re-
ceiving equipment specifically designed, modified, or configured for mili-
tary use … (e) All specifically designed or modified systems or subsystems, 
components, parts, accessories, attachments, and associated equipment for 
the articles in this category … (f) Technical data … and defense services 
… directly related to the articles enumerated in paragraphs (a) through (e) 
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of this category, as well as detailed design, development, manufacturing 
or production data for all spacecraft and specifically designed or modified 
components for all spacecraft systems.17
A final point of note for the present analysis concerns the exemption of 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states and major non-
NATO allies from ITAR, which was originally created in a more or less com-
prehensive fashion under the 1998 Strom Thurmond Act. However, this ex-
emption could still be revoked (and this has indeed occurred) if appropriate 
in furtherance of the security and foreign policy of the U.S.18 A similar fate 
befell the special relationship between the U.S. and Canada.19
In view of the fact that the U.S. was both the world’s primary military 
power and its preeminent space power, it was obvious that it would play a 
leading role in drafting comparable instruments on the international level. 
Indeed, much of the approach taken at the national level and the substance 
addressed in the legal instruments summarily discussed here has transpired 
to the international level, and as such has also influenced the European re-
gime to be discussed shortly in major ways. Concomitantly, it will be clear 
that these international arrangements do not simply copy the U.S. national ar-
rangements. This is the case for an array of reasons.
The Missile Technology and Control Regime and the Wassenaar 
Arrangement 
  
The first of such international arrangements relevant today is the Missile 
Technology Control Regime (MTCR).20 The MTCR was initiated in an effort to 
control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, i.e., nuclear, chemi-
cal, and biological weapons,21 and their means of delivery. In other words, it 
focuses on rockets, and hence, almost automatically has an impact on launch 
vehicles for peaceful, civil, and commercial missions, and their payloads. The 
MTCR is an informal and voluntary association of, as of today, 34 participat-
ing states22 sharing the goal of non-proliferation and willing to coordinate na-
tional export licensing efforts to that end. The MTCR was established in 1987, 
by Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. 
These states had considered it necessary to counter unwanted proliferation 
by establishing some measure of control over, and transparency with regard 
to, the transfer outside of their respective territories and jurisdictions of mis-
sile equipment, material, and related technologies usable for systems capable 
of delivering weapons of mass destruction.
The MTCR Guidelines for Sensitive Missile-Relevant Transfers23 form the 
cornerstone of the MTCR, offering a set of common export policy guidelines 
applied to an integral common list of controlled items—the MTCR Equip-
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ment, Software, and Technology Annex.24 Decisions on the guidelines and 
the contents of the lists are taken by consensus in order to enhance adher-
ence, as such still voluntary, and partner states regularly exchange informa-
tion about relevant national export licensing issues. As a result, many states, 
not just the MTCR partners, have introduced export-licensing measures on 
such items as rocket and other delivery systems, and related equipment, ma-
terial, and technology.
The second major international arrangement of relevance here con-
cerned the 1995 Wassenaar Arrangement.25 It currently counts 40 participat-
ing states:26 largely, the same as those participating in the MTCR.27 Just like 
the MTCR, the Wassenaar Arrangement is a global, formally non-binding ar-
rangement on export controls—but broader, in this case, as it applies to con-
ventional weapons more generally, and in addition to any sensitive dual-use 
goods and technologies.
Historically, the Wassenaar Arrangement evolved from the Coordinating 
Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) regime of the Cold War 
era.28 The main difference from that perspective concerns Russia, in its prior 
manifestation as Soviet Union the original key target of the regime. By con-
trast, it is now party to the Arrangement, just as it has become a partner un-
der the MTCR, in an effort to preclude proliferation of its relevant capabilities 
to third states in the changing geopolitical environment.
The Wassenaar Arrangement was designed to promote transparency 
and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms, dual-use goods, 
and dual-use technologies. Participating states commit themselves to ensure 
through national policies and, where appropriate, regulations that cross-bor-
der transfers of these items do not contribute to the development or enhance-
ment of military capabilities of certain states considered a potential threat to 
international security and stability.29
Like with the MTCR, under the Wassenaar Arrangement, the decision to 
allow or deny transfer of any item remains the sole responsibility of each in-
dividual participating state.30 Thus, in fact export controls differ from state to 
state—for example, in terms of documentation required, license fees, length 
of time to get a license, and duration of validity of the license. Furthermore, 
and most fundamentally there are differences in principle as to which ex-
port would be authorized. Thus, the participating states only agree to notify 
transfers and denials of, as well as to control export of, all items in the List of 
Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and the List of Munitions, annexed to the 
Arrangement.31 In any event, “controls do not apply to ‘technology’ [includ-
ing software] ‘in the public domain,’ to ‘basic scientific research,’ or to the 
minimum necessary information for patent applications.”32 The List has two 
annexes of sensitive items and of very sensitive items, respectively, to which 
different levels of control should be applied, and are reviewed regularly to 
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reflect technological developments. Finally, the participating states agree 
to exchange general information on risks associated with transfers of con-
ventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies in order to consider, 
where necessary, the scope for coordinating national control policies to com-
bat these risks.33
The relationship between MTCR and Wassenaar Arrangement in general 
terms reflects the relationship in the U.S. context between the AECA/Depart-
ment of State/USML/ITAR and EAA/Department of Commerce/CCL/EAR 
regimes. In roughly equivalent fashion, like the AECA/Department of State/
USML/ITAR regime, the MTCR developed primarily with a focus on arms 
and munitions (in space terms, missiles/launch vehicles), whereas, like the 
EAA/Department of Commerce/CCL/EAR regime, the Wassenaar Arrange-
ment tried to capture the more comprehensive spectrum of dual-use goods, 
services, and technologies (in space terms, including notably, satellites).
Consequently, similar complications arose as to where a particular item 
would best be dealt with; also, the Wassenaar Arrangement had a List of Mu-
nitions to control. However, in the case of the U.S. a more or less permanent 
tug-of-war between the two regimes had been the result, leading to the shift-
ing back and forth, especially of satellites, including components and technol-
ogies. By contrast, the voluntary character of the two international regimes 
and the remaining sovereign discretion of the individual states parties thereto 
to establish and maintain their own export control regimes as appropriate, 
caused such conflicts in this context to be absent, at least from public view.34
Neither the MTCR nor the Wassenaar Arrangement recognizes the EU 
in any substantive manner; neither are they, as indicated, in themselves for-
mally binding treaties. The last consideration also played a major role in the 
determination within the U.S. to maintain a more legally enforceable and sub-
stantively tighter domestic regime by means of ITAR and other control mech-
anisms. For Europe, both of the above concerns mattered.
As a result, within Europe the desire arose to deal further with the same 
issue in a more classical, legally binding format, which led to the enunciation 
of a truly European regime for the control of exports of dual-use items and 
technology properly. In the process, the complications resulting from dealing 
with security-sensitive exports by means of two different regimes could to 
some extent be avoided. The European governments would take care to align 
developments in the context of that legal regime on a continuous basis with 
updates in both the MTCR and with the Wassenaar Arrangement, which af-
ter all amongst its participating states counts the main non-European allies, 
the U.S. and Canada. In addition, more or less like in the U.S., this regime has 
an obvious bearing upon the specific areas of space industry and commerce, 
because of the high proportion of military, defense, security, and dual-use is-
sues involved in the human space endeavor.
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Europe and Military, Defense, Security, and Dual-Use Issues 
  
It was not altogether self-evident for a more or less European-wide regime 
to deal with such military, defense, security, and dual-use issues to be real-
ized, whether the focus would be on space only, or more comprehensively, 
on all security and dual-use issues. Neither of the two principal instruments 
for European integration relevant here, the European Community (EC)/EU 
and the European Space Agency (ESA), were namely intended to play any 
role in such sovereignty-sensitive areas.
ESA was established in 1975, to pool the financial and technical resources 
of its member states35 for the purposes of outer space, in terms primarily of 
research and development.36 ESA, in accordance with its constitutive Con-
vention, is supposed to “provide for and to promote, for exclusively peaceful 
purposes, cooperation among European States in space research and technol-
ogy and their space applications, with a view to their being used for scientific 
purposes and for operational space applications systems.”37
Traditionally this has been interpreted as a ban on ESA involvement in any 
space activities of a military or defense nature; ESA member states at least for 
this purpose interpreting “exclusively peaceful purposes” in a strict fashion.38 
Relevant clauses in contracts or agreements with ESA as a partner should 
therefore continue to include references to peaceful uses, whatever their pre-
cise meaning might currently be. When the launcher development and fur-
ther marketing activities were branched off to the newly created Arianespace, 
this did not change. Also, Arianespace was obliged to offer its services only 
in a non-military context, and as a French company, it was also controlled by 
France for the purposes of the relevant international commitments (first Co-
Com, then MTCR).39
Further proof that ESA was not to interfere in any way with national se-
curity concerns of its member states was found in a clause on sensitive infor-
mation. In spite of a general obligation to “facilitate the exchange of scien-
tific and technical information pertaining to the fields of space research and 
technology and their space applications” in the context of ESA programs, “a 
Member State shall not be required to communicate any information obtained 
outside the Agency if it considers that such communication would be incon-
sistent with the interests of its own security or its own agreements with third 
parties, or the conditions under which such information has been obtained.”40 
Additionally, any transfer of “technology and products developed under the 
activities of the Agency or with its help” outside of the member states should 
be subject to a regime indicating when such transfers could be authorized, 
“bearing in mind the peaceful purposes of the Agency.”41
Similarly to ESA, the EC/EU42 has always been formally supposed to limit 
its activities to those that do not involve defense and military issues.43 For the 
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time being, to the extent they are to be discussed in the EU framework at all, 
defense and military issues are relegated to the Common Foreign and Secu-
rity Policy (CFSP), the EU pillar established to deal with common foreign and 
security policy. The CFSP, however, is a straightforward intergovernmental 
construction.44 There is at best a marginal role for the European Commission 
in its context as supposed guardian of the overarching European interest.45 
There is no role for the elaborate legislative, adjudicative, and enforcement ju-
risdiction for either the European Parliament, in addition to the Commission, 
or the European Court of Justice that was developed in the context of the EC 
Treaty. Thus, the cooperation under the CFSP can result in the “implementa-
tion of a joint action or a common position,” but can never “relate to matters 
having military or defense implications”; those issues remain exclusively re-
served for national governments to deal with as they see fit.46
In Europe, matters of international cooperation in the areas of defense and 
security had been, at least until the EU and the CFSP started to play a role in 
this context, dealt with in the context of NATO47 or the Western European 
Union (WEU).48 Interestingly enough, the WEU is now being integrated into 
the EU structures, albeit still as part of the intergovernmental CFSP. More-
over, such integration is a slow process. It started in 1999 with a first level of 
integration of WEU functions into the EU framework, has meanwhile led to 
the handing over of the WEU satellite center at Torrejon, Spain to become the 
EU Satellite Center, jointly with a European Institute of Security Studies in 
2002; but, has not been finalized yet, and some even doubt whether it will be 
ever complete.49 The Treaty on European Union refers to the role of the WEU 
in somewhat ambiguous terms. Security policies in the context of the CFSP 
pillar “shall not prevent the development of closer cooperation between two 
or more Member States on a bilateral level, in the framework of the Western 
European Union (WEU) and NATO, provided such cooperation does not run 
counter to or impede that provided for [through the CFSP].”50
The paradigmatic axiom that neither ESA nor the EU was supposed to 
touch upon any issues concerning defense and security has become subject 
to gradual erosion recently. This has come about in a rather indirect manner, 
in view of the statutory limitations resting upon both organizations to stay 
away from clearly military and defense-related matters. It can largely be con-
tributed to, or was at least is very much reflected by, two major European-
wide initiatives in space. In both cases, the Commission, representing the EU 
in this context, took the political, then also institutional and legal, lead, and 
ESA was duly entrusted with the technical and operational setting-up of the 
two space systems concerned—both, of necessity, with the more or less en-
dorsement of the respective member states.
The first space project is Galileo, the envisaged satellite timing, position-
ing, and navigation system under exclusively European control, for which the 
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Commission since 1994 had started to draft, then got accepted EC-level legisla-
tion providing a solid legal basis for the project.51 With the acceptance by EU 
and ESA member states of the full spectrum of envisaged services to be deliv-
ered by Galileo, the interpretation of “exclusively peaceful purposes” has been 
allowed to shift. Under the current, broader interpretation, involvement in se-
curity issues, at least as long as of a purely defensive nature, alternatively being 
sanctioned at the United Nations (UN) level, is now considered possible.52
A sort of precursor to this issue arose in the case of the intergovernmental 
satellite organization INMARSAT that is comprised of most European states 
as member states. Under its statutory documents, INMARSAT was obliged to 
comply with the mandatory requirement that all its activities were to be for 
“exclusively peaceful purposes.”53 Consequently, the question arose whether 
INMARSAT was entitled to offer its services in the context of the UN-sanc-
tioned operations in Iraq in 1991.54 Interestingly, when INMARSAT was 
privatized in 1999, so as to evolve into a private operator, Inmarsat super-
vised by a residual intergovernmental International Mobile Satellite Organi-
zation (IMSO), this obligation continued to apply.55
The second major European space project concerns Global Monitoring for 
Environment and Security (GMES).56 This initiative, decided upon principally 
in 2001, is envisaged to become the pan-European contribution to the Global 
Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS), representing a global effort to 
enhance environmental protection with the help of satellite technology, with 
a view to the “E” of Environment. GMES also contains explicitly the “S” of 
Security, which gradually came to be interpreted in a wide sense, beyond the 
more politically safe concept of “civil security” to encompass the more tradi-
tional, military and defense issues involved in security.
This then (Galileo and GMES), was the political climate in which it turned 
out to be possible for the European Commission to carefully push for and re-
alize EC-wide legislation on the more specific security-focused issue of con-
trol of trade in sensitive technology. In doing so, it would back-up the MTCR 
and the Wassenaar Arrangement with a more solid and coherent legally bind-
ing regime on a European level.
The Baseline Framework for a European Regime 
  
The current legal regime in the context of the EU, with respect to dual-use 
goods, technology, and expertise in terms of export controls, was developed 
based on Regulation 1334/2000.57 In many ways, this Regulation presents a 
follow-up specifically for the EU and its member states to the international re-
gimes discussed above: a transformation thereof for the control of exports of 
dual-use items and technology into binding law for the EU itself and its mem-
ber states.
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This becomes rapidly clear upon closer analysis of Regulation 1334/2000. 
The main aims of the Regulation are to develop an “effective common sys-
tem of export controls on dual-use items [which] is necessary to ensure … the 
international commitments and responsibilities of the Member States, espe-
cially regarding non-proliferation, and of the European Union,” through “a 
common control system and harmonized policies for enforcement and mon-
itoring.”58 It should be noted that this is considered, amongst others, “a pre-
requisite for establishing the free movement of dual-use items inside the Com-
munity,” which is the most fundamental justification for EU institutions to 
address the issue of international trade in dual-use goods in the first place.59
Furthermore, the Regulation’s Annex I, containing the List of Dual-Use 
Items and Technology that provides the substance of the regime, states in 
this respect “This list implements internationally agreed dual-use controls, 
including the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Missile Technology Control Re-
gime (MTCR), the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG), the Australia Group, and 
the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).”60 The Australia Group concerns 
chemical and biological weapons, and therefore, would not likely lead to in-
sertions into the Regulation’s regime relevant from the perspective of space 
activities, as is the case with the NSG and the CWC. Of course, as already in-
dicated, this is different for the MTCR and Wassenaar Arrangement.
Regulation 1334/2000 has been amended on average almost once a year since 
by instruments of EC law, but still remains the key document in the present con-
text. The main body of the Regulation sets up the basic regime; the Annexes 
through their updates take account of new developments regarding the subject 
matter itself. In particular Annex I, listing the dual-use items and technology, 
which were subject to the regime created by the Regulation, was amended time 
and again to keep track of ongoing technical developments as they also were 
leading to updates under the Wassenaar Arrangement in particular.
In terms of the scope of the regime established by Regulation 1334/2000, 
dual-use items are broadly defined as all “items, including software and technol-
ogy, which can be used for both civil and military purposes,”61 whereas export 
comprises “normal” export of goods, but extends to “transmission of software 
or technology by electronic media, fax, or telephone to a destination outside the 
Community,”62 and “exporter” is equally broadly defined.63 Such a definition of 
dual-use items clearly could encompass more or less all space technology, and 
with “export of technology” already being at issue in the mere case of exchange 
of information by means of fax or telephone, the broad sweep of—as with the 
application of ITAR in the U.S.—the European regime becomes clear.
“Technology” itself is also defined in such broad terms, albeit not in the 
main body of the Regulation itself, but by Annex I; “specific information nec-
essary for the development, production, or use of goods,” further elaborated 
in that “this information takes the form of technical data or technical assis-
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tance,” whereby the latter “may take forms such as instructions, skills, train-
ing, working knowledge, and consulting services, and may involve the trans-
fer of technical data,” and these may, in turn, “take forms such as blueprints, 
plans, diagrams, models, formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifica-
tions, manuals, and instructions, written or recorded, on other media or de-
vices, such as disk, tape, and read-only memories.”64
Follow-Up Regulations 
  
The clause quoted last does not come from Regulation 1334/2000 itself, but 
from an instrument of EC law following up on its substantive details. Such 
substance of those follow-up instruments, dealing with such issues as the 
items subject to export controls under it, as well as the authorization frame-
work following from the complex structure of categorization of these items, 
will be discussed later. First, the general structure of the regime built upon 
Regulation 1334/2000 will be addressed.
As already indicated, Regulation 1334/2000, in particular the List of Dual-
Use Items and Technology as contained in Annexes I and IV, which will be 
dealt with below, was established in such a way as to take into account rel-
evant changes in technical developments, preponderantly those reflected 
by the international regime of the Wassenaar Arrangement referred to ear-
lier. Thus, Chapter IV of the Regulation specifically provides that “the lists of 
dual-use items set out in Annex I and Annex IV shall be updated in confor-
mity with the relevant obligations and commitments, and any modification 
thereof, that each Member State has accepted as a member of the international 
non-proliferation regimes and export control arrangements, or by ratification 
of relevant international treaties.”65
This concerns, in particular, the following regulations, taking care of a 
more or less annual update, especially of the relevant Annexes: 
• Regulation 2889/2000, providing for minor changes to Annexes I and 
IV;66
• Regulation 458/2001, providing for minor changes to Annex I;67
• Regulation 2432/2001, providing for updates to, and replacement of, the 
Annexes to take account of, inter alia, changes adopted by the Wassenaar 
Arrangement plenary session in December 2000;68
• Regulation 880/2002, providing for minor changes to Annex IV;69
• Regulation 149/2003, providing for updates to, and replacement of, the 
Annexes to take account of, inter alia, changes adopted in the context of 
the Wassenaar Arrangement’s regime in the course of 2001 and 2002;70
• Regulation 885/2004, ensuring application of a number of EC Regula-
tions and Decisions including Regulation 1334/2000 to the ten then-new 
EU member states;71
• Regulation 1504/2004, providing for updates to, and replacement of, the 
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Annexes to take account of, inter alia, changes adopted in the context of 
the Wassenaar Arrangement’s regime between December 2002 and De-
cember 2003;72
• Regulation 394/2006, providing for updates to, and replacement of, the 
Annexes to take account of, inter alia, changes adopted in the context of 
the Wassenaar Arrangement’s regime;73
• Regulation 1183/2007, providing for updates to, and replacement of, the 
Annexes to take account of, inter alia, changes adopted in the context of 
the Wassenaar Arrangement’s regime;74 and
• Regulation 1167/2008, providing for updates to, and replacement of, the 
Annexes to take account of, inter alia, changes adopted in the context of 
the Wassenaar Arrangement’s regime.75
Since, so far, Regulation 1167/2008 constitutes the latest updates of An-
nexes I and IV, reference will be had to those latest versions wherever appro-
priate. This brings the analysis to the issue of the substance of these Annexes, 
as these determine to a great extent the application of the two-pronged autho-
rization structure under the Regulation regime.
The Annexes: Providing the Technical Substance 
  
The technical substance of the European export control regime is provided 
by a complicated interplay of three Annexes: (1) Annex I provides the bulk of 
the items; (2) Annex II provides a list of certain items excepted from the stan-
dard consequences of being included in Annex I; and (3) Annex II includes a 
separate Annex IV for control over additional items.
Further to Article 3 of Regulation 1334/2000, it is in the first place Annex I, 
entitled the “List of Dual-Use Items and Technology,” which “implements in-
ternationally agreed dual-use controls including the Wassenaar Arrangement 
[and] the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).”76 Interestingly, com-
pared to the previous version as per Regulation 1183/2007, the Annex now no 
longer includes a specific reference to the possibility that individual member 
states might have additional prohibitions in place, which would continue to 
be valid: “No account has been taken of any items that Member States wish to 
place on an exclusion list. No account has been taken of any national controls 
(non-regime origin controls) that may be maintained by Member States.”77
Annex I contains introductory statements and a list of definitions of terms. 
The most important of those is the aforementioned broad definition of “tech-
nology” for the purpose of the Regulation. Exceptions to the application of 
the Regulation as far as technology is concerned apply to “information in the 
public domain, to basic scientific research, or to the minimum necessary in-
formation for patent applications.”78 Especially, the first and third exceptions 
may be of key importance for the commercial/civil space sector to the ex-
tent the international activities involve a transfer of off-the-shelf technology 
114   F. v o n d e r dun k  i n  Astropolitics  7 (2009)
(equivalent here to being “in the public domain”), or a transfer of technical in-
formation that is unavoidable if an invention is to be protected. This does not 
imply that such transfers ipso facto are allowed, or otherwise go uncontrolled. 
The relevant national authorities now have the freedom, in the absence of ob-
ligations under the EC regime, to decide on limiting such transfers, as long 
as this occurs in conformity with certain secondary requirements imposed by 
Regulation 1334/2000 relating to justification of the limitations, as well as, in-
forming other stakeholders in the European regime.79
The reference to non-applied scientific research, excepting it from the 
scope of the regime here, is to be noted. The focus of the EC-law regime is 
clearly on the commercial aspects, where there would only be secondary at-
tention for basic scientific research, rather than on establishing a level of con-
trol that takes Europe’s security concerns directly into consideration. This is 
in line with general EC-law concerns for an Internal Market and a level play-
ing field for commercial ventures throughout the EU; the main concern here 
is to have similar, equivalent, or equal requirements, not to arrive at either 
strict or relaxed requirements as such.
Definitions that result in likely implications for many European space proj-
ects, including Galileo and GMES, and many more commercial satellite com-
munication or remote sensing activities, are “cryptography,”80 “digital com-
puter,”81 “hybrid computer,”82 “information security,”83 “main storage,”84 
“microcomputer microcircuit,”85 “microprocessor microcircuit,”86 “multi-
data-stream processing,”87 “network access controller,”88 “program,”89 “real 
time processing,”90 “software,”91 “source code,”92 “tape,”93 and “spacecraft,” 
meaning “active and passive satellites and space probes.”94 The main body of 
Annex I consists of the List itself, divided into ten categories. Amongst those, 
Categories 0 (nuclear materials, facilities, and equipment), 1 (materials, chem-
icals, “microorganisms,” and “toxins”), 2 (materials processing), and 8 (ma-
rine), would not directly seem to be relevant for many space activities at is-
sue in the present analysis, especially not when focusing upon commercial 
space.95 The relevant Categories are discussed next.
Electronics 
  
Category 3 is entitled “Electronics” and is further subdivided as follows:96 
• Systems, equipment, and components, dealing essentially with relevant 
hardware;
• Test, inspection, and production equipment, equally dealing with rele-
vant hardware;
• Materials, concerning the physical materials that could be used for pro-
ducing certain relevant hardware and other products;
• Software, which focuses on software designed for developing or produc-
ing equipment under the first bullet point above, but also includes simu-
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lation software, especially designed for the development of lithographic, 
etching, or deposition processes for translating masking patterns into 
specific topographical patterns in conductors, dielectrics, or semiconduc-
tor materials;97 and
• Technology, which includes technology for the development or produc-
tion of a microprocessor microcircuit, or microcomputer microcircuit and 
microcontroller microcircuit core.98
As space activities in general, including also commercial space activities, are 
a high-key technological sector, inevitably a major amount of electronic sys-
tems, software, and technological know-how will be involved, which may 
come within the scope of the regime. Hence, the operators undertaking those 
activities might benefit from the European transparency, to some extent even 
de facto harmonization, resulting from the authorization structure discussed 




Category 4 is entitled “Computers” and lists the following controls:99 
• Systems, equipment, and components, dealing essentially with rele-
vant hardware, such as digital computers, electronic assemblies, and 
processors;
• Software, including operating system software, and software develop-
ment tools and compilers, especially designed for multi-data-stream pro-
cessing equipment, in source code;100 and
• Technology, essentially for the purpose of development, production or 
use of any of the above.
Once again, the involvement of computers in space activities is evident and 
comprehensive. It does not only involve systems, components, and software 
part of a spacecraft to be transported outside the member states of the EU, for 
instance for purposes of the launch, but also such systems, components and 
software as are to be exported to third countries for ground stations.
Telecommunications and Information Security 
  
Category 5 is entitled “Telecommunications and Information Security.”101 
The relevant controls, include: 
• Part 1—Telecommunications, containing: 
o Systems, equipment, and components, focusing on relevant 
hardware involved in telecommunications, both wireless and 
wired, enjoying special physical protection against interference 
or generally of high quality;
o Test, inspection, and production equipment with a view to the 
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above subcategory;
o Software for any of the above; and
o Technology, essentially for the purpose of development, produc-
tion, or use of any of the above, broadly defined to possibly in-
clude technology for the development of telecommunications in 
the service of data generation, production, and generation.102
• Part 2—Information Security,103 containing: 
o Systems, equipment, and components, dealing with all hardware 
relevant for information security purposes, including cryptogra-
phy and digital techniques;
o Test, inspection, and production equipment with a view to the 
above subcategory;
o Software for any of the above, including for development, pro-
duction, use, and support thereof; and
o Technology, essentially for the purpose of development, produc-
tion, or use of any of the above.
The application of the items in Part 1 may seem limited to the satellite com-
munications sector only, but this would ignore the fact that for instance re-
mote sensing satellites, navigation satellites, and space stations need a certain 
amount of communication capability to function as planned. Part 2 is more re-
fined in its de facto applicability to the space sector. Apart from military com-
munications, which do not fall in principle under the EC-law regime, espe-
cially in certain satellite navigation services or Earth observation activities the 
use of cryptography would bring those activities easily within the scope of 
this particular heading.
Sensors and Lasers 
  
Category 6 is entitled “Sensors and Lasers” and is further subdivided as 
follows:104 
• Systems, equipment, and components, including in particular: 
o Optical sensors, such as various categories of space-qualified, 
solid-state detectors, non-space-qualified, focal plane arrays, 
mono-spectral imaging sensors, multispectral imaging sensors 
designed for remote sensing applications, and special compo-
nents for optical sensors;105
o Cameras with certain characteristics as specified;
o Optics, including those components that are space-qualified;106 
and
o Radar systems, equipment, and assemblies with certain charac-
teristics as specified.
• Test, inspection, and production equipment, especially with regard to op-
tical equipment;107
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• Materials of a certain nature inter alia for producing optical equipment;108
• Software for any of the above; and
• Technology, essentially for the purpose of development, production or 
use of any of the above.
As to the scope of the regime from a space-vantage point, many remote sens-
ing activities, whether GMES-related or commercial/civil, would be im-
pacted. Notably, both “mono-spectral imaging sensors,” i.e., sensors that “are 
capable of acquisition of imaging data from one discrete spectral band,”109 
and “multispectral imaging sensors,” i.e., sensors that “are capable of simul-
taneous or serial acquisition of imaging data from two or more discrete spec-
tral bands,”110 are included in the list of definitions, and fall within the re-
gime under consideration.
Navigation and Avionics 
  
Category 7 is entitled “Navigation and Avionics” and is further subdi-
vided as shown below:111 
• Systems, equipment, and components, including notably: 
o Global navigation satellite systems receiving equipment, and 
specially designed components, employing decryption or a null-
steerable antenna, including if designed or modified for use in 
space launch vehicles and sounding rockets,112 but also:
o Inertial systems and their components, including if designed for 
spacecraft;113
o Gyro-astro compasses and similar devices, including if tracking 
satellites for their purposes;114 and
o Guidance sets usable in missiles of a certain minimum 
accuracy.115
• Test, inspection, and production equipment specifically involved in test-
ing, inspecting, or producing any of the systems, equipment, or compo-
nents mentioned under the above subcategory;
• Software designed for any of the above; and
• Technology, following the general definition and as far as involved in 
any of the above, including for instance for the integration of the flight 
control, guidance, and propulsion data into a flight management system 
for optimization of rocket system trajectory.116
This category is of key importance for satellite navigation. While the sys-
tems themselves, i.e., the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS), the Russian 
GLONASS, Galileo, and others (China, Japan, and India, for example, have 
plans for systems) for obvious reasons are not subject to the regime, most 
aspects of downstream usage, focusing on receivers and the technology be-
hind them, are. In fact, this Category makes specific reference to GPS and 
GLONASS as current versions of such systems. The key caveat herein is that 
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only receivers employing either encryption techniques or null-steerable an-
tennae are subject to the harmonization regime, which causes a major por-
tion of global navigation satellite systems devices to fall outside the scope 
thereof.
Once more, it should be noted that the difference between falling within 
its scope or remaining outside thereof, is not a difference between exports 
thereof being controlled or not. The difference, by contrast, is solely between 
such export being controlled according to certain EU-wide requirements still 
leaving the ultimate decision to allow export or not in national sovereign 
hands, and such export completely being a matter of national discretion, in-
cluding the option not to control it altogether, subject only to being properly 
justified.
Aerospace and Propulsion 
  
Finally, Category 9, entitled “Aerospace and Propulsion” entails the fol-
lowing controls:117 
• Systems, equipment, and components, including for example such de-
vices as space launch vehicles and spacecraft; liquid rocket propulsion 
systems using a circumscribed array of components as well as engines 
involved; solid rocket propulsion systems and engines, including rele-
vant components; hybrid rocket propulsion systems, engines and their 
components; sounding rockets and individual rocket stages as long 
as capable of a range of at least 300 km [kilometers]; re-entry vehicles 
and even liquid propellant tanks used for rockets with the capability 
of delivering at least a 500 kg [kilograms] payload to a range of at least 
300 km;118
• Test, inspection, and production equipment, basically again as involved 
in testing, inspecting, and producing any of the above, including acoustic 
vibration test equipment of a certain minimum capability;119
• Materials, such as insulation material in bulk form and interior lining for 
rocket motor cases usable in missiles;120
• Software specifically developed for much of the above; and
• Technology, again as relevant for any of the above.
This category applies to launcher development and manufacturing and 
launch service provisions, and it represents the core element of the MTCR 
regime in the European context. The direct relevance of this Category is to 
launcher hardware, software, and technology for security considerations; 
these considerations in the area of satellite navigation are much more of an 
indirect nature. As a consequence, the list of items to be controlled at a Euro-
pean level, or at least under European coordination and transparency mecha-
nisms, in the present Category is quite comprehensively drafted.
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Other Controls 
  
As indicated, Annex II121 inter alia provides for a list of items excepted from 
the standard consequences of being included in Annex I.122 Annex II refers to 
items specified in Annex IV, and further explicitly lists a limited number of 
items, of which there are three of interest in the context of space activities. All 
these items are presumably too sensitive to leave them to be regulated under 
a common authorization, as opposed to being controlled by the individual 
sovereign member states of the EU.
The three specified items of relevance concern: 
1. “technology for the integration of the flight control, guidance, and pro-
pulsion data into a flight management system for optimization of rocket 
system trajectory;”123
2. “hybrid rocket propulsion systems with total impulse capacity exceeding 
1.1 MNs [meganewtons];”124 and
3. “staging mechanisms, separation mechanisms, and interstages, usable in 
missiles.”125
Annex IV provides a list of items concluded in the main list of Annex I 
considered so sensitive that (in deviation from the general thrust of the Reg-
ulation to allow for transfers of items within the EU) even such intra-commu-
nity transfers of these items are made subject of an obligation to obtain an au-
thorization.126 With a view to what authorizations would be available, Annex 
IV is divided into two parts, of which Part II is not relevant in the present con-
text as it deals with items related to international controls under the Chemical 
Weapons Convention or the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group arrangements.127 Of 
such items, with a view to the categories of Annex I and those deemed to be 
of relevance for space activities, Part I deals with broad categories of stealth 
technology, strategic control, and MTCR technology. Here, some items may 
be specifically mentioned with regard to space activities.
The subcategory of items of stealth technology encompasses two items of 
Category 6, of which “systems specially designed for radar cross-section mea-
surement usable for missile and their subsystems” should be noted here.128 In 
the subcategory relevant for Community Strategic Control issues, the main set 
of items currently relevant equally refers to Category 6 items, including items 
for acoustics, plus a few items relating to noise reduction under Category 8. 
A further subset is recognized within this subcategory, of “Items of the Com-
munity Strategic Control-Cryptography-category 5 Part 2,” which may be rel-
evant for space activities in a broad sense.129
Finally, the subcategory of MTCR technology items contains an extend list 
of items belonging to Categories 7 and 9. They include: “Guidance sets, usable 
in missiles, capable of achieving system accuracy of 3.33 % or less of the range 
… except guidance sets designed for missiles with a range under 300 km;”130 
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“Space launch vehicles capable of delivering at least a 500 kg payload to a 
range of at least 300 km;”131 sounding rockets with the same capability;132 in-
dividual rocket stages if usable for rocket systems with the same capability;133 
rocket engines, systems, or components usable in missiles;134 re-entry vehi-
cles except if “designed for non-weapon payloads;”135 and assorted produc-
tion equipment, software items, and technologies for any of the above.136
The extent to which this subcategory of MTCR items has the potential to 
stifle non-military or security-related space activities is reflected in four addi-
tional provisions. These provide that the controls under this heading are not 
applied to items 
1. that are transferred on the basis of orders pursuant to a contractual re-
lationship placed by the European Space Agency (ESA) or that are trans-
ferred by ESA to accomplish its official tasks; 2. that are transferred on the 
basis of orders pursuant to a contractual relationship placed by a Member 
State’s national space organisation or that are transferred by it to accom-
plish its official tasks; 3. that are transferred on the basis of orders pursuant 
to a contractual relationship placed in connection with a Community space 
launch development and production programme signed by two or more 
European governments; and 4. that are transferred to a State-controlled 
space launching site in the territory of a Member State, unless that Member 
State controls such transfers within the terms of this Regulation.137 
In those four cases, the control inherently exercised by ESA, the main EU or-
gans, and the governments concerned is considered adequate, at least suffi-
ciently so not to require further controls under Regulation 1334/2000 to be 
put in the way of efficiently conducting the civil space activities concerned.
This is a rather complicated set up, as Annex I includes a very extended 
baseline list of items but Annexes II and IV, each for their own purposes, 
carve out some especially sensitive items. The main reason behind this set-up 
lies in the specific consequences to be attached to the various categories, sub-
categories, and exceptional categories under the authorization framework de-
veloped by Regulation 1334/2000. This is analyzed next.
The Authorization Regime 
  
Ultimately, the regime functions based on the authorization aspects as es-
tablished by Regulation 1334/2000. Authorization is required for export of 
the dual-use items listed in Annex I, taking the Wassenaar Arrangement’s 
List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies as point of departure, augmented 
as relevant by controlled goods and technologies under, amongst others, the 
MTCR.138 The obligations of a prospective exporter are not limited to screen-
ing an exhaustive list and then abiding by its terms. There are three scenar-
ios under which such an exporter would be obliged to comply with the con-
trol and authorization mechanisms provided by the Regulation, also where 
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the items concerned as such are not listed in Annex I, or Annexes II and IV, as 
they deal in more detail with specific parts thereof.
Under the first scenario, the exporter is informed by competent EU mem-
ber state authorities that such an item might become involved in developing, 
producing, or otherwise handling weapons of mass destruction in contraven-
tion of the Regulation’s aims and purposes.139 The same obligation pertains if 
the exporter himself has become aware of such an involvement.140
Under the second scenario, export is at issue to a “purchasing country or 
country of destination,”141 which happens to be subject to an arms embargo 
that is the result of appropriate decision-making within either the Council of 
the European Union,142 the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Eu-
rope (OSCE),143 or the UN Security Council.144
Under the third scenario, the export would concern items that “are or may 
be intended, in their entirety or in part, for use as parts or components of mil-
itary items listed in the national military list that have been exported from the 
territory of that Member State without authorization or in violation of an au-
thorization prescribed by national legislation of that Member State.”145 Here, 
the need for harmonization at the EU level for the purpose of enhancing trade 
in dual-use issues as long as not security-sensitive gives way to the individ-
ual sovereign rights of the member states. These states remain specifically en-
titled to determine their preferred level of security above and beyond that 
determined to be generally applicable under the Regulation’s regime—al-
beit, that such higher member state thresholds are only allowed “for reasons 
of public security or human rights considerations,” and require the member 
state in question to immediately inform the Commission.146
That sovereignty is still the underlying current in this area is also ev-
idenced by another clause. This clause establishes the possibility for a pro-
spective exporter to be confronted with requirements for authorizations im-
posed by member states under national laws and regulations outside of the 
system of the Regulation properly speaking, as outlined above.147 In such 
cases, the Regulation only imposes upon the member state adopting or main-
taining such relevant legislation a duty to inform other member states as well 
as the Commission.148
The Community General Export Authorization 
  
Authorizations under the Regulation’s regime can be of two principled 
kinds. The starting point, the main reason for developing a control regime at 
the European-level in the first place, is a Community General Export Authori-
zation (CGEA), which was established by Regulation 1334/2000.149 The CGEA 
explicitly constitutes an exception to the sovereign discretion of member states 
referred to earlier; it formally confirms that for all other items, that is those not 
covered by it, any authorization shall be granted, or refused, by the member 
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state where the exporter is located.150 It is, consequently, the scope of the CGEA, 
which is further defined through the complex interplay between Annexes I, II, 
and IV. That scope is essentially limited in two ways relative to the scope of the 
general authorization obligation under the Regulation as discussed above.
First, ratione materiae only items as defined by Annex I—with the excep-
tion of those mentioned in Part 2 thereof—require the CGEA, as opposed to 
a national authorization.151 As can be glanced from the previous overview of 
Annex I, this actually covers the bulk of controlled items listed under the Re-
gime. Second, ratione personae the CGEA covers such exports only to the ex-
tent the target destination is Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Nor-
way, Switzerland, or the U.S.152 In other words, with respect to some key 
allies in the context of NATO and the Wassenaar Arrangement, as well as the 
two ESA member states that are not members of the EU, individual national 
security sensitivities are not considered to be put at risk by any harmoniza-
tion at a European level.
Further exceptions to applicability of the CGEA occur in three more lim-
ited scenarios dealt with in Annex II as far as items not covered by Annex I 
are concerned. In the first exception, either the exporter has been informed by 
the competent authorities of the EU member state in which he is established 
that the items in question are crucially involved with weapons of mass de-
struction, or he has otherwise become aware that the items in question are 
intended for such use.153 This is a rather straightforward exception, dealing 
with cases where national, and international, security is considered threat-
ened too directly for any authorization to take place. In principle, it may be 
relevant for some cases involving space related technology.
The second case is where the items in question are destined for a state sub-
ject to an EU, OSCE, or UN arms embargo, or if the exporter is aware that the 
items in question are intended for such use.154 This clause is to honor obliga-
tions undertaken either in the context of the EU’s political machinery itself, 
or within the two broader organizations mentioned, with regard to measures 
internationally agreed to counter threats to international peace and security, 
and those obligations cannot be allowed to be undercut somehow by applica-
tion of the CGEA.
The third case deals with a separate issue. The CGEA cannot be called upon 
to authorize exports in case the relevant items are to be exported to a destination 
within a customs free zone or free warehouse.155 If such exports were to be al-
lowed, the possibility to control onward export to states to which they should not 
be exported is thwarted. This case defies the controls the CGEA seeks to apply.
National Authorization 
  
The delineations of the scope of application of the CGEA in various ways, 
means that as if by default, in other cases the national member states maintain 
A eur o p e A n “eq u i v A l en t” to un i te d StA te S ex p o r t Co n tr o lS    123
their sovereign discretion to apply domestic controls. The final responsibility 
for deciding on applications for export authorizations, outside the scope of 
the CGEA, lies with the national authorities of the EU member states.156 Con-
sequently, the competent authorities may refuse to grant an export authoriza-
tion and may annul, suspend, modify, or revoke an export authorization that 
they have already granted.157
To begin with, this concerns cases where the CGEA would not apply be-
cause one of the three scenarios referred to above is applicable (involvement 
in a context of weapons of mass destruction, export to a state under a relevant 
embargo, or to a free zone or free warehouse). This would apply, however, in 
spite of the items being concerned ratione materiae falling within the scope of 
Annex II. Next, domestic controls continue to apply for any export of items 
in Annex I, ratione personae, to states other than EU member states or the lim-
ited group of states mentioned in Annex II: Australia, Canada, Japan, New 
Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and the U.S. Third, as discussed, they apply 
to items specifically mentioned by Annex II, which includes the complete list 
provided in Annex IV. Lastly, they apply to any items not listed altogether in 
the Annexes to the Regulation. Following from the underlying sovereignty-
dominated logic, EU member states may also in their discretion decide to 
“prohibit or impose an authorization requirement” regarding items not listed 
in Annex I as long as such controls are justified on the grounds of public secu-
rity or human rights considerations, and such states “notify any measures ad-
opted pursuant” to this clause to the Commission.158
A national authorization may generally be of three kinds: individual; global; 
or general, valid throughout the Community.159 While leaving the choice to the 
national member state authorities, regarding which type of authorization to use 
in a certain case, a few specific limits are imposed by the Regulation in that 
regard. In any event, when deciding upon the grant of a national authoriza-
tion, an EU member state shall take into account international obligations and 
commitments, such as those under the MTCR, Wassenaar Arrangement, inter-
nationally agreed sanctions as applicable, and considerations of national and 
foreign security policy, including such as following from the European Union 
Code of Conduct on arms exports, intended end-uses, and risks of diversion.160
As to individual authorizations, to be applied on a case-by-case basis, the 
Regulation imposes one main caveat in relation to the sovereign discretion of 
an EU member state. Such a state, if requested for such an authorization, is 
required to consult with other member states in every case where the items 
for which the authorization is requested are present in such other member 
states.161 As to the global authorizations, the approach taken here is to cover 
a type or category of items in a more general fashion, and allow the export of 
any items falling within its scope to one or more specified states.162
For general authorization the approach is the same as under the CGEA, 
only this time on a national level; a list is issued where the presumption is 
124   F. v o n d e r dun k  i n  Astropolitics  7 (2009)
that export is authorized unless specific reasons inform against this.163 Such 
reasons refer to cases where the exporter either is informed by relevant au-
thorities or has become aware himself that the items in question are, or may 
be, intended for use in the context of weapons of mass destruction, in contra-
vention of an arms embargo following from EU Council, OSCE, or UN Secu-
rity Council decisions, or for use ultimately in contravention of the national 
export controls of the member state concerned.164
Items listed in Annex II—which, as analyzed, include also the items listed in 
Annex I—as such may not be included in a general authorization; such items 
require the more targeted approach of an individual or global authorization be-
ing applied.165 The exception here is the list of items listed in Annex IV, but 
only as far as intra-Community trade is concerned; in those cases (comprising 
of stealth technology, and strategic control items, including cryptography items 
and MTCR technology), use of a national general authorization is allowed.166
Conclusions 
  
In Europe, the issue of controlling the export of military and dual-use tech-
nology is considered a crucial aspect of national security of the individual Eu-
ropean states. Absent an ingrained supranational system for dealing with secu-
rity issues (not even the EU as of now has been able to establish an autonomous 
position in that field beyond the intergovernmental CFSP), the individual sov-
ereignty of those states remains preeminent in regulating such exports.
Nevertheless, amongst key European states a clear need for moving be-
yond the levels of transparency, consultation, and coordination already of-
fered by international, non-binding regimes, such as the MTCR and the 
Wassenaar Arrangement, has been apparent for roughly a decade. This de-
velopment was linked to a realization that if Europe should take a more pro-
active role in that area for the benefit of all concerned, a certain level of har-
monization would be indispensable.
The first result is Regulation 1334/2000, which in conjunction with follow-
up Regulations (most recently, Regulation 1167/2008) created a complex in-
terlocking system of European-wide and national authorizations. That system 
required such authorizations in varying measures for the export of the items 
listed in a few interlocking Annexes to other EU member states, a limited set 
of close political allies respectively, and other states and destinations.
For many readers, this will raise the question whether that system has 
been able to avoid the pitfalls of, notably, the U.S. system. The main point 
here concerns the balance between security interests and commercial/indus-
trial interests, where most criticism directed at ITAR concern the perception 
that the balance has tilted far too much towards the security interests. The 
commercial space industry (primarily, but not exclusively the U.S. one), even 
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if it is not security sensitive, consequently finds itself considerably obstructed 
in its international cooperation, marketing, and sales activities. How compre-
hensive then is the EC regime from such a comparative perspective?
The major novelty established by the EC-law regime based upon Regula-
tion 1334/2000 is the establishment of the CGEA, as the most outspoken ef-
fort to arrive at a standardization and simplification of licensing procedures 
for export. The CGEA constitutes a semi-automatic European-wide authori-
zation for exports of dual-use items. The most sensitive items (such as any 
items involved in the development, production, or handling of weapons of 
mass destruction), however, remain under various national controls. The re-
quirements imposed by the regime in this regard only posit obligations re-
lated to information and consultation, wherever relevant.
Still, the CGEA is seen as an important step towards a coherent European 
export control regime. It deals ratione materiae with the bulk of items possibly 
requiring export controls, including those as following from various sets of 
international obligations (from MTCR and Wassenaar Arrangement, to OSCE 
and UN sanctions) by means of Annex I. It only allows for a relatively limited 
set of exceptions, following inter alia from Annexes II and IV. Ratione personae, 
the limitations of this harmonizing step are considerably more limited since 
only intra-Community trade and trade with a handful of close allies are fall-
ing within the CGEA’s scope.
The relative flexibility of the structure under Regulation 1334/2000 and its 
later additions, through the mechanism of the Annexes allowing for contin-
uous updating, ensures the latest relevant developments are appropriately 
taken into consideration. This, of course, refers to the discourse on the inter-
national and global level of non-proliferation and export controls, and, in par-
ticular, how it impacts the space arena; MTCR, the Wassenaar Arrangement, 
and for that matter the U.S. ITAR, as they have a major impact on the interna-
tional arena, are subject to the changing realities in the world at large.
From this perspective, the CGEA also presents another interesting novelty. 
MTCR and the Wassenaar Arrangement are voluntary regimes. By contrast, 
the EU regime, and the CGEA in particular, for all its complexities and def-
erence to state sovereignty, reflect the willingness of a group of like-minded 
states to subject themselves to a system of international controls. Even if as 
of yet this does not concern the most sensitive areas, and even as these states 
collectively at least are still controlling any new extensions of the scope of the 
regime (notably through their membership on the EU Council and the inter-
governmental nature of the CFSP, which basically requires unanimity and al-
lows non-agreeing states to opt out), this is not a negligible achievement.
The reason is, at least in part, the indirect approach taken by the Commis-
sion. It does not focus as such on the issue of controls, but on the distorting 
effects on the Internal Market that result from widely divergent levels of con-
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trol on the export of certain goods or services. From that perspective, there is 
no fundamental difference between bananas, banking services, and bomb-car-
rying missiles. As long as they are objects of economic trade and transactions, 
any conditions, limits, and requirements imposed upon their export should 
be harmonized throughout the EU to create such an Internal Market and pre-
clude license shopping for the most lax regime. In addition, from that per-
spective, the nature of such conditions, limits, and requirements is of second-
ary importance only. Whether of a monetary nature (export or import tariffs), 
of a quantitative nature (export or import quota), or of an administrative na-
ture (guarantees that certain onward exports or certain usage in the context of 
weapons of mass destruction are precluded), they should be applied equally 
across the EU member states in order to maintain a level playing field.
Put differently, the fact that bomb-carrying missiles are different from ba-
nanas and banking services, and that guarantees as referred to are necessary 
and appropriate, should lead to appropriate levels of controls, not to differ-
ent levels of controls, across the EU. While the EC-law regime, as the legal in-
strument involved, can preclude, at least in theory, the latter, achieving the 
former as such is not yet within its purview, but all the same is the hoped-for 
outcome of the application of that instrument.
In this context and with a view to international space cooperation and the 
international space industry in particular, two further contributions to the in-
ternational discourse offered by the EC-law regime based upon Regulation 
1334/2000 are particularly noteworthy. One, while the regime is far from sim-
ple, it at least avoids the conflicts between two entities responsible for, re-
spectively, the core issue of delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction 
and the broader issue of sensitive dual-use technology. The domestic situ-
ation in the U.S., with AECA/Department of State/USML/ITAR often pit-
ted against EAA/Department of Commerce/CCL/EAR, with items moving 
back and forth and with prospective exporters often wondering where their 
particular item might fit in, is thus largely avoided in Europe. As mentioned, 
this situation has largely been reflected on the international level, although, 
the MTCR and the Wassenaar Arrangement avoided many of these practical 
problems from arising by default, because of the legally non-binding charac-
ter of both regimes. The EC-law regime, by contrast, comprises the two in one 
regime, while adding the other international non-proliferation regimes stem-
ming from NSG, the Australia Group, and the CWC.
Two, as mentioned, a clear-cut set of exceptions to the non-applicability of 
the harmonizing effects of the EC-law regime to MTCR technology items as 
listed in Annex IV is provided for. It applies in case such items are involved 
in civil or commercial space endeavors. These cases are defined as exports 
of items, if taking place in the context of ESA activities, activities of national 
space agencies (under the control, after all, of the national governments), ac-
tivities under the sway of the EU, activities undertaken in the context of in-
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ternational cooperation between two or more EU member states, or activities 
otherwise falling within the control of an EU member state. No authorization 
is indeed made applicable to any such items if the exports take place within 
the Union, whereas the CGEA applies to exports outside of the EU.
It is on those two accounts that the EC-law regime based on Regulation 
1334/2000, evolving as it is, represents an important contribution to building 
a globally transparent and balanced regime, taking into account both the jus-
tified security concerns of the states concerned and the commercial interests 
of the space industries in those countries, as part of their potential contribu-
tions to global peace and welfare. This, the more so in that the EC-law regime 
throughout rather faithfully follows the relevant definitions devised at the in-
ternational level, instead of devising its own, new set of definitions, which al-
ready in itself considerably adds to the transparency and coherence. Business 
always benefits from transparency and coherence, in outer space as much as 
anywhere else does. But also, national and international security in the last 
resort is not helped by the existence of arcane, needlessly complicated, and 
non-transparent regimes as commercial entrepreneurs may not be the only 
ones interested in seeking out the loopholes and oversights inherently result-
ing from such controlling regimes.
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